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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present how to model moral sensitivity and emotions
in organizational setting by using the SocLab formal framework. SocLab is a platform for the
modelling, simulation and analysis of cooperation relationships within social organizations – and more
generally Systems of Organized Action.
Design/methodology/approach – Simulation results, including an interesting tendency for a Free
Rider model, will be given. Considering that actors’ decision-making processes are not just driven
by instrumental interest, the SocLab learning simulation algorithm has been extended to represent
moral sensitivity, making actors trying to prevent bad emotions and feel good ones.
Findings – Some simulation results about actors’ collaboration and emotions in a Free Rider model were
presented. A noteworthy tendency is that actors’ unconditional collaboration, which occurs when their
moral sensitivity reaches its highest value, is not so good since it exempts other actors from collaboration
(they take advantage from the unconditional collaboration), while values of moral sensitivity somewhat
below the highest value (between 0.7 and 0.9) still induces collaboration from others.
Originality/value – The research and results presented in this paper have not been presented
in other papers or workshops. The presented quantitative definition of emotions (determining indexes
of emotions) is different to previous approaches – for instance, to Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC)
qualitative descriptions and to logical descriptions. Similarly, simulation of morality in organizations
is a new research field, which has received scarce attention up to now.
Keywords Decision making, Organizational structures, Social systems, Modelling, Game theory,
Simulation
1. Introduction
Social simulation consists in the modelling of social systems, including economics,
organization, politics, history or social-ecological systems (see, e.g. the JASSS online
journal for a number of examples), for the study of their behaviour and emergent
properties by the performance of computer simulations (Axelrod, 1997).
Regarding the simulation of social relationships (Squazzoni, 2012), Sibertin-Blanc
et al. (2013a) proposes a formalization of the Sociology of Organized Action (Crozier and
Friedberg, 1980) which studies how social organizations are regularized, as a result of
the counterbalancing processes among the power relationships of the social actors.
According to this theory, the behaviour of each actor is strategic while being framed by
his bounded rationality (Simon, 1998). In this approach, the interaction context defines
a social game, where each actor adjusts his behaviour with regard to others in order,
as a meta-objective, to obtain a satisfying level of capability to reach its goals. The aim
of a social game is to find stationary states, i.e. a configuration where actors no longer
modify their behaviour because each one satisfies himself with the level of capability he
obtains from the current state of the game, so that the organization is in a regularized
configuration and can durably operate in this way.
The formalization implemented in the SocLab platform (El Gemayel, 2013) enables
to define the structure of an organization as an instance of a generic meta-model,
to study its structural properties with analytical tools, to explore the space of its
possible configurations (and so to discover its Pareto optima, Nash equilibriums,
structural conflicts and so on), and to compute by simulation, as a result of the social
game, how it is plausible that each actor behaves with regard to others within this
organizational context.
The SocLab framework has been applied to the study of concrete organizations
(see e.g. Sibertin-Blanc et al., 2006; Adreit et al., 2010; El-Gemayel et al., 2011;
Sibertin-Blanc et al., 2013a) on the basis of sociological inquiries. However,
in some cases, the simulation algorithm that makes actors to play the social game
(Sibertin-Blanc and El Gemayel, 2013b) provides results about the behaviour of some
actors that do not accurately match the field observations.
This gap between the observed and the computed behaviours can be ascribed to
the fact that SocLab neglects emotions. However, it is well known that, along
phenomena such reputation and trust (Giardini et al., 2013), social emotions are an
essential driver of the regulation of actors’ behaviours within organizational settings.
Consciously or not, social actors seek to experience positive emotions (such as joy,
pride or gratification) and to avoid negative ones (shame, remorse and so on). Thus,
they anticipate the possible outcomes of their behaviour on themselves and on others in
proportion of their moral sensitivity.
Thus, a moral sensibility parameter has been introduced in the SocLab’s
decision-making process of actors. This parameter incites an actor to select a behaviour
that satisfies not only its own capability to reach its goals but also its contribution to
the capability of others and so the proper working of the whole organization.
By the way, the consideration of this individual parameter shed light on the social
emotions that actors are likely to feel within organizations. To this end, we follow the
Ortony et al. (1988) theory of emotions Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC) to propose a
quantitative measure of moral emotions assessed in terms of the actor’s situations
at SocLab regulated configurations, that is configuration resulting from simulations.
A preliminary work was presented in Terán et al. (2014a, b). To illustrate this proposal,
simulation results of a Free Rider model are offered, in which we have found the
following tendency: when some actors have their largest value of moral sensibility
(ms¼ 1), and consequently are strongly collaborative, other actors take advantage of
this and exempt from collaborating. Thus, the best level of collaboration within a
System of Organised Action (SOA) is reached when actors’ ms is somewhere below the
maximal value (in (0.7, 0.9)).
The paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the SocLab
modelling framework. The third section gives a short overview of the OCC
theory. Section 4 explains how the moral sensibility parameter is introduced in
the learning algorithm, and defines some quantitative measures of emotions. Section 5
presents simulation results for a Free Rider model. And, finally, Section 6 depicts
some conclusions.
2. SocLab
To enable the modelling of social relationships between the actors of an organization,
SocLab proposes a meta-model that catches the common concepts and properties of
social organizations and is instantiated on specific cases as models of concrete
or virtual organizations or, more generally, SOA (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980).
Accordingly, the model of the structure of an organization is composed of instances
of the Actor and Relation types that are linked by Control and Depend associations.
Figure 1 shows the meta-model of organizations’ structures as a UML class diagram.
A relation is founded on an organization’s resource, or a set of related resources, that is
controlled by a single actor. Resources are material or cognitive (factual or procedural
believes or expectations) elements required to achieve some intended actions, so that
their availability is necessary for some actors to reach their goals.
The state attribute of a relation represents the behaviour of the controller actor with
regard to the availability of the resource for the ones who needs it. Its range of value SB
goes from the least cooperative behaviour, −1, of the controller preventing the access to
the resource, to the most cooperative behaviours, 1, favouring this access, while the 0
value stands for neutral behaviours.
The stake attribute of the dependence of an actor on a relation corresponds to the
actor’s need of the relation to reach its own goal, on a scale:
null ¼ 0; negligible ¼ 1; . . .; significant ¼ 5; . . .; critical ¼ 10:
The effect function evaluates how much the state of the relation makes the resource
available to the actor, so that effectr: A× SBr → [−10, 10] has values in:
worst access ¼ "10; . . .; neutral ¼ 0; . . .; optimal access ¼ 10:
In addition, actors may have solidarities the ones with regard to others, defined by as
function:
solidarity a; bð Þ- "1; 1½ &;
where negative values correspond to hostilities and positive values to effective
friendships.
Defining the state, or configuration, of an organization as the vector of all relations
states, each state of the organization determines on the one hand how much each actor
has the means he needs to achieve his goals, defined as:
satisfaction a; sð Þ ¼
X
cAA
X
rAR
solidarity a; cð Þn stake c; rð Þn effectr c; srð Þ: (1)
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and, on the other hand, how much it contributes to the satisfactions of each other
actor, defined as:
influence a; b; sð Þ ¼
X
rAR; a controls r
X
cAA
solidarity b; cð Þn stake c; rð Þn effectr c; srð Þ:
(2)
This interaction context defines a social game, where each actor seeks, as a meta-
objective, to obtain from others enough satisfaction to reach its goals and, to this end,
adjusts the state of the relations he controls. Doing so, it modifies the value of its
influence and therefore the satisfaction of actors who depend on the relations it controls.
The end of a social game is to reach a stationary state: there, actors do no longer
change the state of the relations they control, because everyone accepts his level of
satisfaction provided by the current state of the game, so that the organization is in a
regulated configuration and can steadily work in this way.
The actors’ strategic behaviour is framed by their bounded rationality (Simon, 1998),
where the actors’ decision-making process is implemented as a process of trial and error
based on a self-learning rule system. Each actor manages a variable that corresponds to
his ambition, and the game ends when the satisfaction of every actor exceeds his ambition
(see Sibertin-Blanc et al., 2014b) for details about this collaborative learning process.
To sum up, each simulation run yields a regularized configuration which associates
to each actor numerical values for its satisfaction and its influence, and these values may
be used to determine whether this configuration is able to arouse a kind of emotion.
3. The OCC theory of emotions
Emotions are a very active field of research in many scientific domains (biology,
cognitive or social psychology, etc.), leading to a fragmented view of this notion.
We characterize emotion by using the theory of Ortony et al.’s (1988) OCC which
relies on the appraisal view of emotions (Moors et al., 2013). This model of emotions
is well funded and widely recognized as a standard in computer science, notably in
Multi-Agents-Based Simulation, and it deals with all social emotions we have to consider.
Following OCC, emotions are linked to events, to actions of people (oneself or other)
or to objects. Emotions are either positive or negative (their valence) and classified in a
tree structure (see Figure 2), as follows: first, in case the linked element is an event that
affects the achievement of a goal, the outcome of the event is appraised either as
desirable or as undesirable, and the actor feels either pleased or displeased,
correspondingly; second, in case the linked element is an action that complies or not
with a behavioural norm, the actor appraises the action either as praiseworthy or
blameworthy, and his reaction will be either approval or disapproval; third, in case the
linked element is an object, the actor appraises the object either as appealing or
unappealing and so he will either likes or dislikes it. In SocLab only the two first kinds
of emotions appear: goal based (e.g. related with properties of a configuration whose
occurrence is an event) and norm based (e.g. regarding the behaviour of one actor
towards another one or towards the whole SOA) since actors do not face objects.
Emotions related to prospected events can also not be considered, because the SocLab
model of actors accounts just their current situation, not their expectations. A SocLab
event corresponds to the fact that a simulation experiment puts the organization in a
certain configuration. Then, the feeling of an actor corresponds to its positive or
negative appraisal of its contribution to this configuration.
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Despite the highly fragmented and confuse ideas about emotions regarding, for instance,
emotion regulation and its consequences, proposed by the diverse theories in the literature
(Leventhal, 1980), OCC has become a standard (the more accepted description of emotions
used) in computer science, artificial intelligence and simulation. However, this does not
mean either that OCC is necessarily better than other theories of emotions existing in the
literature, or that it has successfully solved the difficulties to cope with emotions, but
rather that it offers attributes appropriate for many applications. Notably, this theory is
very coherent internally and presents a very good structure of emotions, it covers a large
range of emotions and it is well suited to formalize and implement in computer.
4. SocLab decision-making algorithm and the quantification of emotions
In the original SocLab actors’ decision-making algorithm, actors seek to maximize their
satisfaction. In the new algorithm being tested in this paper, each actor is equipped
with a moral sensibility parameter and the maximizing of its own satisfaction is
replaced by maximizing its aim that also considers its contribution to the well-being of
others. The aim of an actor is defined as a linear combination of its satisfaction
(or instrumental goal, what it gets from others to reach its goals) and its influence (what
it gives to others), weighted by its moral sensibility parameter, as follows:
Aim a; sð Þ ¼ 1"abs ms að Þð Þð Þ n Satisfaction a; sð Þþms að Þ n Influence a; sð Þ; (3)
where abs is the operator absolute value; Satisfaction(a, s) is what the actor a receives
from others at the configuration s, (see Equation (1)); Influence(a, s) is what the actor a
gives to others at the configuration s (see Equation (2)); and ms(a) is the moral
sensibility of the actor a defined in the interval [−1, 1].
The ms parameter of each actor quantifies the relative importance of its
instrumental (Satisfaction) and moral (Influence) goals. The higher the value of this
parameter, the more the actor considers its contribution to the satisfaction of all others
and thus the well working of the organization. Usually, it takes values in [0, 1],
as negative values mean that the lower the actor’s collaboration (even if it is negative)
the higher will be the actor’s achievement of its aim, what rarely occurs. Moral
sensibility corresponds to the disposition to give importance to moral issues, including
the feeling of moral emotions such as shame or pride: the larger the moral sensibility
of an actor, the higher the actor’s feeling of both positive and negative emotions.
4.1 Quantifying emotions in SocLab
Table I shows the emotions a SocLab actor is likely to feel in a configuration of the
organization. The occurrence and intensity of an emotion at a configuration are given in
pairs, defined as a potential and two thresholds. If the potential is above the high
threshold then the positive emotion occurs, and if it is below the low threshold then the
negative emotion occurs. In case the potential is between the thresholds then no emotion
appears. The potential of an emotion is defined in proportion as a ratio between what
actually happens (e.g. the influence exerted by the actor) and what could happen (e.g. the
maximum influence it could exert). Indeed, a social actor “appraises” the situation in the
context of the possibilities available for it. The real emotional interpretation of the values
of each index depends on the very nature of the organization under consideration and
of individual traits of each actor. Globally, considering as an example the Joy/Distress
emotion, one could consider that Joy appears above 70 per cent (high threshold)
and distress under 50 per cent (low threshold).
These indexes are based on essential properties of configurations, i.e., what
is given (Influence) by a to b, and what is received (Satisfaction) by a from b, where
a and b may be a particular actor or the whole organization, as shown in Table I.
The higher the value of ms of an actor, the higher its concern for collaboration,
and so what it purposes to give to others, that is: first, the higher will be the
contribution of a to positive emotions of actors who depend on the relation a controls,
for instance their joy ( joy is based on what the actor receives from itself and others);
and second, the higher will also be the intensity of emotions such as Pride of a, which
depend on what it gives.
We will use short names for the variables: Sat(a, s) for Satisfaction(a, s), Inf(a, s)
for Influence(a, s), minSat(a) (respectively, maxSat(a)) for the minimal (respectively
maximal) satisfaction a can receive from others. Because of the lack of space, we
give the complete definition only for the first emotion, and short summaries of some
others (for a complete description of these quantitative measures of emotions see Terán
et al., 2014b).
4.1.1 Well-being emotions: joy/distress. The OCC model defines joy (respectively
distress) as to be pleased (respectively displeased) about the occurrence of a desirable
(respectively undesirable) event. In the SocLab model of an organization, the occurrence
of such an event corresponds to reaching a regulated configuration that is satisfying
(respectively dissatisfying). Joy/Distress of an actor a is given as:
Potential: propSat a; sð Þ ¼ Sat a; sð Þ"minSat að Þð Þ= maxSat að Þ"minSat að Þð Þ;
which value is in 0; 1½ &:
Thresholds: JoyThresh að Þ and DistressThreshðaÞ
are the thresholds making actor a liable to these emotions
Intensity: Joy a; sð Þ ¼ max 0; propSat a; sð Þ" JoyThresh að Þ
" #
Distress a; sð Þ ¼ max 0;DistressThresh að Þ" propSat a; sð Þ
" #
:
4.1.2 Attribution emotions: Pride/Shame and Admiration/Reproach. An actor could feel
prideful (respectively guilty or shameful) when he approves (respectively disapproves)
its own praiseworthy (respectively blameworthy) action regarding its effect on itself
or on some other actor(s) close to it. But an actor can also feel prideful by a
praiseworthy action performed by an actor close to it. This proximity of an actor a
towards another actor b can evaluated as its Cognitive Unity cogUnit(a,b) ∈ [1, 1].
Influence exerted by
Self Other(s) The whole SOA SOA and self SOA and other
Satisfaction received by
Self Pride/shame Admiration/reproach Joy/distress
Other Pride/shame Admiration/reproach If pleased/displeased
about desirable event:
happy-for/resentment
undesirable event:
gloating/pity
SOA Pride/shame Admiration/reproach Joy/distress Gratification/remorse Gratitude/anger
Table I.
Emotions
experienced by an
actor in SocLab
Thus, the pride/shame of a when it evaluates what b gives to c will be (it might be the
case that either a¼ b, a¼ c or b¼ c):
Pride a; b; c; sð Þ ¼ max 0; propInf b; c; sð Þð
"
"PrideThresh b; cð ÞÞn cogUnit a; bð Þn cogUnit a; cð Þg;
Shame a; b; c; sð Þ ¼ max 0; ShameThresh b; cð Þð
"
" propInf b; c; sð ÞÞn cogUnit a; bð Þn cogUnit a; cð Þg;
where:
propInf b; c; sð Þ ¼ Inf b; c; sð Þ"minInf b; cð Þð Þ= maxInf b; cð Þ"minInf b; cð Þð Þ;
cogUnit a; bð Þ ¼ ms að ÞnSol a; bð Þ:
provided that cogUnit(a,b)W0 and cogUnit(a,c)W0, otherwise both pride and shame
are null.
So, we define pride/shame as the product of a measure of actor a’s approval of the
action of b ( profInf(a,b,s)), multiplied by the cognitive units of a with b and with c. This
is in accordance with the extension of OCC proposed by Steunebrink et al. (2012) (they
consider only the case a¼ c).
The case for Admiration/Reproach is similar but a sees b as another, i.e. cogUnit(a,b)
is null and so it is not taken into account. Also, a has a positive cognitive unit towards
c and it evaluates the influence of actor b on c.
4.1.3 Well-being/attribution compounds emotions: gratification/remorse and
gratitude/anger. OCC defines gratification (respectively remorse) as being pleased
(respectively displeased) about a desirable (respectively undesirable) event or situation
that results from oneself action and thus entails the approving (respectively
disapproving) of one’s own praiseworthy (respectively blameworthy) action. As said
above, an event is related with the action of the whole SOA, which results from action
of individuals. If the actor feels Joy (respectively Distress) about the situation of the
SOA and it considers himself as responsible for it, then it will feel Gratification/
Remorse, as follows:
Gratif ication a; sð Þ ¼ max 0; ð propGSat sð Þ"GratifThresh að ÞÞnms að ÞnpropInf a; sð Þ
" #
;
Remorse a; sð Þ ¼ maxf0; ðRemorseThresh að Þ"propGSat sð ÞÞnms að Þn proInf a; sð Þg;
where propGSat(s) is the global proportion of satisfaction the SOA has.
Gratitude (anger) is a similar case to gratification (remorse), but it regards what is
given by someone else instead of what is given by oneself (in the right side of the
equation we will have propInf(b, s) rather than proInf(a, s).
5. A case: the Free Rider model
This model includes four actors and four relations, where actor Ai controls relation Ri,
for i¼ 1, …, 4. As shown in the left side of Figure 3, A1 depends on the three relations
controlled by the other actors with a stake of three on each. Actors A2, A3 and A4
highly depend on the relation controlled by A1 (with stake nines) and every actor
depends much more on others than on the relation it controls, in the proportion 1/9.
There is no relationship between any pair of actors A2, A3 and A4. The right side of
Figure 3 shows the effect functions: for each relation, the functions to the controller
actor and the other actor(s) have opposite slopes, that is, the interest of each actor on the
relation it controls is contrary to the interest of other actors.
5.1 Behaviour entailed by the moral sensibility parameter
The simulation experiments usually converge towards the configurations given
in Table II, where each configuration represents a norm of behaviour: either all actors
collaborate (configuration C1) or only one of the actors defects (C2, …, C4), rarely two
of them defect (C5, …, C7), not often A1 defects (C8), and never three or all of them
defect. When ms¼ 0, the reference case, A1 collaborates in any case and, in most cases,
either A2, A3 or A4 defects while benefiting from the cooperation of the two others.
Actors
A1 A2 A3 A4 Relevance ofthe relation
R
el
at
io
ns
R1 1.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 28
R2 3.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 4
R3 1.03.0 0.0 0.0 4
R4 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4
A1 A2 A3 A4
R1
R2
.
R3
.
R4
.
Notes: In the right side, the effect functions of relations on actors:
the satisfaction given to the actor (y-axis) depends on the state of
the relation (x-axis)
Figure 3.
In the left side:
stakes of the actors
on the relations
(in bold the relation
is controlled by the
actor) for
structure 1/9
Configurations (state of R1, …, R4)
Satisfaction of
(A1, …, A4)
Frequency when ms¼ 0 for all
actors (%)
C1: (10, 10, 10, 10): all collaborate (80, 80, 80, 80) 10
C2: (10, −10, 10, 10): A2 does not
collaborate (20, 100, 80, 80) 30
C3: (10, 10, −10, 10): A3 does not
collaborate (20, 80, 100, 80) 30
C4: (10, 10, 10, −10): A4 does not
collaborate (20, 80, 80, 100) 30
C5: (10, −10, −10, 10): A2 and A3 do not
collaborate (−40, 100, 100, 80) 0
C6: (10, −10, 10, −10) A2 and A4 do not
collaborate (−40, 100, 80, 100) 0
C7: (10, 10, −10, −10): A3 and A4 do not
collaborate (−40, 80, 100, 100) 0
C8: (−10, 10, 10, 10): A1 does not
collaborate (100, −100, −100, −100) 0
C9: (−10, −10, −10, −10): nobody
collaborate (−80, −80, −80, −80) 0
Table II.
Typical
configurations of the
1/9 free rider game,
where a
configuration is
defined as (stateR1,
…, stateR4)
The graphs in Figure 4 show the frequency of configurations for the following
exploration of parameters: structure of the model, which takes the distribution of stakes
1/9 and 2/8; and moral sensibility (ms) of the actors varying in [0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 1.0]. Each
experiment consisted in 200 runs.
We can observe a noteworthy tendency: too much (unconditional) collaboration from
one or several actors is not good for the whole organization, as other actors take
advantage from this. Let us explain using the graphs:
• case 1: until A3.ms¼ 0.6, there is no significant change. Then, the higher A3.ms
(disposition to collaborate of A3), the higher the number of C1 (all actors
collaborate) until A3.ms reaches the value 0.8; when A3.ms is larger than 0.8, the
higher the value of A3.ms, the lower the number of C1 since the number of
defections of A2 and A4 (C2+C4) increases considerably.
• case 2: the higher the ms of actors A2 and A3, the higher the number of C1 up to
ms¼ 0.8 because A2 and A3 collaborate more and more while A4 keeps the same
behaviour. When ms¼ 0.9, the number of C1 decreases because A4 collaborates
less; 127 experiments converged to the configurations C1 or C7, and four to the
configuration C8. For ms¼ 1 we had difficulties to characterize the simulation
output, as the regulated configurations feature intermediate values – for instance
[8.5, 3.75, 3, 10] – which are not in the set C1-C8 (this is also the case for about 63
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Notes: Results of 200 runs for each combination of factors, configuration C8 and C9 
never occur
Figure 4.
Frequency of the
configurations C1,
…, C8 for a
combination of two
factors: in columns,
the structure of the
organization (1/9 or
2/8); in rows, ms
varying from 0 to 1
for either A3; A2
and A3; A2, A3 and
A4; (ms of A1 is
kept to 0)
experiments when ms¼ 0.9). Because of such a difficulty, this set of experiments
will not be taken into account in Section 4.2.
• case 3: the higher the disposition to collaborate of actors A2-A4, the higher the
number of C1, up to the point where it reaches its maximal value (0.7, …, 0.9
in case of structure 1/9 and 0.9 in case of the structure 2/8); when these actors
collaborate unconditionally (ms¼ 1.0), A1 does not need to collaborate anymore
and C8 appears.
These results indicate that the best level of collaboration is between 0.7 and 0.9 rather
than 1.0 (systematic collaboration). This is consistent with the well-known Prisoner
Dilemma experiences, where the tit-for-tat strategy is better than all other strategies
and especially than unconditional collaboration (Axelrod, 1981).
5.2 Joy/distress of actors and state of the relations
This subsection studies the intensity of Joy/Distress, which is selected because it shows
the overall state of each actor. We will consider three cases of variation of the moral
sensibility parameter: ms of A3 in [0,1]; ms of A2, A3 and A4 in [0,1], and finally ms of
A1 in [−1,0]. Only the model with the distribution of stakes 1/9 will be considered.
5.2.1 Case 1: moral sensibility of A3 takes the values 0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 1.0. Table III
indicates that joy of A1 is maximumwhen A3.ms is 0.7 or 0.8 because it corresponds to the
maximum collaboration of all others; joy of actors A2 and A4 keeps somewhat stable with
intensity around 93, while joy of A3 decreases (very) slightly. Joy of A1 decreases when ms
of A3 is over 0.8, because A2 and A4 use the high collaboration of A3 to give less. In the
lower part of Table III, we see how A3’s collaboration (i.e. the state of the relation R3)
increases while the one of A2 and A4 decreases. This result confirms the findings described
above that actors A2 and A4 benefit from A3’s unconditional collaboration.
5.2.2 Case 3: moral sensibility of A2, A3 and A4 takes the values: 0.1, 0.2, …, 1.0.
Table IV shows how A1 benefits (its joy increases) from the higher collaboration of A2,
A3 and A4 as their ms increases. The joy of A2, …, A4 suffers only slight changes.
The highest collaboration of A2, …, A4 is reached when ms¼ 0.7, and stays at that
level for higher values. Interestingly, when actors A2 to A4 do collaborate
unconditionally (their ms¼ 1), A1 defects because it no longer needs to cooperate to
obtain the others’ collaboration. In this case joy of A1 reaches its maximal value
(intensity 100), while actors A2, …, A4 are strongly distressed.
5.2.3 Case 4: moral sensibility of A1 takes the values: 0, −0.1, −0.2, …, −1.0.. As
A1 always cooperates in the reference case (ms¼ 0 for all actors), the question arises until
how low moral sensibility it does so. When ms of A1 decreases from zero towards
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
A1 64 62 64 64 63 61 64 71 71 64 63
A2 93 93 93 93 94 94 93 93 93 94 94.2
A3 93 92 93 93 93 93 93 91 90 90 90
A4 93 93 93 93 92 93 93 93 93 94 94.8
R1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 3.6 3 4.2 4 3 2.7 4.6 4.8 3.7 1.2 1.7
R3 4.4 5.3 5 4.2 3.3 3.9 3.8 8.7 10 10 10
R4 4.7 3 3.5 4.7 5.7 4.1 4.2 3.5 3.9 1.2 0.5
Table III.
Average values of
intensity of joy felt
by the actors, and of
the states of the
relations; varied
factor: A3.ms
negative values, A1 collaborates less and less, reaching the lower point (R1¼−10) from
ms¼−0.5 (Table V). As A1 collaborates less, A2, A3 and A4 also decrease their level of
collaboration. Surprisingly, when A1’s ms decreases from −0.1 to −0.2, the collaboration
of A2, …, A4 increases considerably, as if they tried to induce A1 to do the same.
However, when collaboration of A1 is below −0.3, there is no incentive for other actors to
collaborate and they renounce to do so. From 0.5, only the worst configuration C9 occurs.
6. Conclusion and further research
This paper has shown the introduction of a moral sensibility parameter in the SocLab
actors’ decision-making process. This allows the definition of social emotions together
with quantitative measures of their potential arousal by actors within organizational
settings. The level of its moral sensibility parameter affects the collaboration of an
actor, what it gives to others, and consequently the intensity of positive emotions felt
by actors who depend on it, including itself. The introduction of the moral sensibility
parameter allows actors to orient their selection of a behaviour not only towards their
instrumental satisfaction, but also to the search for positive emotions and the
prevention of negative ones. It will hopefully permit to overcome some limitations of
SocLab, to represent more suitably social organizations and get better results in further
research and applications.
Some simulation results about actors’ collaboration and emotions in the Free
Rider model were presented. A noteworthy tendency is that actors’ unconditional
collaboration, which occurs when their moral sensibility reaches its highest value,
is not so good since it exempts other actors from collaboration (they take advantage
from the unconditional collaboration), while values of moral sensibility somewhat
below the highest value (between 0.7 and 0.9) still induces collaboration from others.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
A1 64 63 63 64 70 72 79 90 90 90 100
A2 93 93 93 93 93 92 90 90 90 90 0
A3 93 94 93 93 92 92 90 90 90 90 0
A4 93 93 93 93 92 92 90 90 90 90 0
R1 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.6 10 10 10 −10
R2 3.6 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.5 5.7 7.4 10 10 10 10
R3 4.4 3.1 4.1 4.5 5.2 5.8 7.4 10 10 10 10
R4 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.4 6.6 6.5 7.6 10 10 10 10
Table IV.
Average values of
intensity of joy felt
by the actors and of
the states of the
relations; varied
factor: ms of A2, A3
and A4
0 −0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −0.4 −0.5 −0.6 −0.7
A1 64 62 83 46 20.4 10 10 10
A2 93 94 57.4 25 12.4 10 10 10
A3 93 93 56.5 24 12.4 10 10 10
A4 93 93 57.8 24 12.5 10 10 10
R1 10 10 2.4 −5.3 −9.2 −10 −10 −10
R2 3.6 2.8 7.4 1.3 −7.5 −10 −10 −10
R3 4.4 2.6 8.8 0.1 −7.5 −10 −10 −10
R4 4.7 4.7 6.7 −0.2 −7.8 −10 −10 −10
Table V.
Average intensity of
joy felt by actors
and of the state of
the relations
depending on A1.ms
varying from 0 to –
0.7 (for A1.ms from
−0.5 to −1 results do
not change)
This finding shows how specific simulation experiences that include modelling of
emotions might bring in valuable conclusions for public policy.
To be able to quantitatively measure emotions in organizational setting (these
understood in a broad sense, including, for instance, institutions and community
organizations) would help us in diagnosing the actual state of actors’ emotions, defining
a desirable/ideal state of emotions of actors in the organizational setting, and inspecting
and tracking changes of emotions over time, in order to compare a desirable state with
the actual state. All this, in turn, allows managers and policy makers to give
appropriate feedback to organizational management via decision making, in order to
direct emotions in the organization towards the desirable state, supporting the
management of emotions, and helping in detecting the effects of implementing certain
forms of emotion regulation. Of course, these applications require a previous validation
and theoretical support in relation to emotion regulation and other issues associates
with management of emotions, taking into account existing research such as that of
Leventhal (1980) and Gross (1998).
Considering emotions in social simulations allows us to introduce emotions as a factor
in simulation scenarios analysis. This, in turn, permits to use the SocLab virtual
laboratory to learn about the impact of emotions on organizational performance, and to
take into account emotions in a large variety of organizational management.
Consequences of all this have a strong potential to impact the whole society, as a
result of the improvement of organizational performance and satisfaction of the
organization workers. It includes benefits to public policy, since organizational
efficiency and effectiveness would be increased – emotion management will accompany
and become an ally, to organizational and institutional improvement.
Further research will consider the inclusion of a parameter to represent actor’s
Group Identification (as defined, among others, by Simon, 1998), which might be
more suitable than the moral sensibility parameter to model actors’ organizational
commitment and motivation. Group identification is understood as an actor’s
self-concept derived from its awareness of its membership in a group, along with the
value and emotional significance of that membership. This notion is also important to
determine emotions to actor’s cognitive unit with others.
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